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Stronger beliefs in human supremacy over animals, and stronger perceived threat posed by 
vegetarianism to traditional practices, are associated with stronger speciesism and more meat 
consumption (Dhont & Hodson, 2014). Both variables might also be implicated in the moral 
exclusion of animals. We tested this potential in a 16-month longitudinal study in the USA (N 
= 219). Human supremacy showed longitudinal effects on the moral exclusion of all animals. 
Vegetarianism threat only predicted moral exclusion of food animals (e.g., cows and pigs), 
and, unexpectedly, appealing wild animals (e.g., chimps and dolphins). These findings 
demonstrate the importance of both human supremacy and perceived threat in explaining 
moral exclusion of animals and highlight potential paradoxical negative consequences of the 
rise of vegetarianism.  
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Longitudinal Effects of Human Supremacy Beliefs and Vegetarianism Threat on Moral 
Exclusion (vs. Inclusion) of Animals  
   
Anecdotal evidence suggests that there exists a double standard in how people treat 
animals depending on whether they are traditionally food animals, companion animals, or 
other type of animals. Specifically, people love some animals but exploit others despite them 
being very similar. This difference is particularly accentuated when we compare pets to farm 
animals in western civilizations (Herzog, 2010; Joy, 2010). Animal rights advocates and 
organizations have repeatedly flagged this moral inconsistency in an attempt to encourage 
people to acknowledge the similarities between pets and farm animals. For example, a Mercy 
for Animals campaign featured pets alongside farm animals with the slogan “Why love one 
but eat the other?”. Presently unknown, however, are the psychological factors that influence 
how people choose the animals included in their moral circles.  
Two key variables relevant for understanding support for animal exploitation and 
consumption are: (a) beliefs in human supremacy over animals (Dhont & Hodson, 2014); and 
(b) perceived threat posed by non-traditional ideologies (e.g., vegetarianism) advocating for 
abandoning meat consumption and the exploitation of animals (i.e. vegetarianism threat, see 
Dhont & Hodson, 2014; Dhont, Hodson, & Leite, 2016). Both human supremacy beliefs and 
vegetarianism threat show meaningful positive associations with frequency of meat 
consumption and acceptance of animal exploitation, even after controlling for the desire to 
eat meat (Dhont & Hodson, 2014). Thus ideologically-motivated beliefs play a critical role in 
explaining support for animal exploitation and consumption and are likely implicated in 
considerations about whether animals are worthy of moral concern.  
However, the effects of human supremacy beliefs and vegetarianism threat have 
rarely been studied, and the extent to which these psychological beliefs are associated with 
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the moral exclusion of different categories of animals remains unknown. Furthermore, extant 
studies relied solely on cross-sectional designs, limiting the conclusions that can be drawn 
from the findings. Indeed, a strict longitudinal test is essential for a comprehensive analysis 
of the predictive role of these variables on moral concern for animals. This paper addresses 
both issues.  
Human Supremacy and Vegetarianism Threat  
Historically, humans have treated (non-human) animals as their inferiors. The 
condescending way that humans treat animals has been conceptualized as a desire for 
domination (Tuan, 1984), reflecting beliefs in human superiority over animals (Dhont & 
Hodson, 2014). Endorsing human supremacy beliefs can serve a legitimizing purpose to 
justify hierarchical human-animal relations and the exploitation of animals for human 
benefits (Dhont & Hodson, 2014; Hyers, 2006), akin to how hierarchy-enhancing 
legitimizing myths justify and promote social inequality and the oppression of low-status 
groups in human intergroup relations (see Hodson & Dhont, 2015; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). 
In line with this idea, stronger endorsement of human-animal inequality and human 
supremacy beliefs are associated with more meat consumption, and with stronger support for 
animal exploitation (Dhont & Hodson, 2014). Furthermore, deemphasizing the hierarchical 
divide between animals and humans has been shown to expand moral inclusivity of animals 
and to reduce speciesism (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012; see also Amiot, 
Sukhanova, Greenaway, & Bastian, 2017). In sum, accumulating evidence suggests that 
beliefs in human supremacy are associated with general negative attitudes towards animals, 
similar to the general effects of social dominance orientation across human outgroups (Kteily, 
Ho, & Sidanius, 2012; Meeusen & Dhont, 2015).  
Yet the way that certain animals are perceived and treated might also be driven by 
perceived threat that arises in response to the growth of non-traditional ideologies and 
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practices that defy the dominant meat-eating traditions. Most people feel uneasy when their 
habits or customs are threatened (Allport, 1954; Stephan & Renfro, 2002). For instance, 
intergroup relations research demonstrates that perceived threats to the ingroup’s norms 
increase negative outgroup attitudes (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Stephan & Renfro, 
2002). The rise of non-traditional or non-normative ways of treating or relating to animals 
(e.g., vegetarianism), might pose a subjective threat to those that see meat consumption as 
central in their culture - vegetarianism threat (Dhont & Hodson, 2014; Dhont et al., 2016).  
MacInnis and Hodson (2017) showed that heightened perceptions of vegetarianism 
threat are associated with more negative attitudes towards vegetarians and vegans. 
Vegetarianism threat has also been associated with more meat consumption and greater 
support for animal exploitation (Dhont & Hodson, 2014), as well as with justifications for 
meat consumption and the derogation of animals (Monteiro, Pfeiler, Patterson, & Milburn, 
2017). This is consistent with research showing that heightened perceived threat posed by 
environmentalists to the Western way of life (i.e. environmentalist threat) is associated with 
stronger denial of climate change and less support for environmentally-friendly policies 
(Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016). That is, environmentalist threat triggers a pushback against the 
environment itself (see also Gromet, Kunreuther, & Larrick, 2013). Together, these findings 
suggest that threats posed by unconventional movements and ideologies that challenge the 
dominant ways of treating nature or animals might paradoxically worsen the attitudes and 
reactions towards the targets these movements aim to defend. Therefore, vegetarianism threat 
might have negative effects on moral exclusion of animals, particularly those that vegetarian 
and vegan movements are set to protect – food animals.  
Given that both human supremacy beliefs and vegetarianism threat are associated 
with negative attitudes (i.e. speciesism) and behavior (i.e. meat consumption) towards 
animals (Dhont & Hodson, 2014), we argue that both concepts likely play a critical role in 
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explaining moral exclusion of animals. Specifically, we suggest that over time these 
ideologically-motivated beliefs about human-animal relations predict moral exclusion of 
animals more than the converse. 
The Psychology of Moral Concern for Animals 
People treat others with fairness particularly when included within the psychological 
boundaries that define who is worthy of fair treatment (Opotow, 1990; Opotow, Gerson, & 
Woodside, 2005) and moral consideration (i.e. moral circles, Crimston, Bain, Hornsey, & 
Bastian, 2016; Laham, 2009; Singer, 1981). Those who fall outside these boundaries are 
morally excluded and are often targets of exploitation, deprivation, or largely ignored. 
Indeed, not all animals are perceived as worthy of moral consideration. The meat paradox 
illustrates how people can be concerned for animal welfare in general and yet support 
exploitative practices towards specific animal categories, such as through meat consumption 
(Bastian & Loughnan, 2017; Loughnan, Bratanova, & Puvia, 2012).  
To date, most research on moral concern for animals has focused on the distinction 
between food and non-food animals. For example, Bratanova, Loughnan, and Bastian (2011) 
demonstrated that different moral concern is applied to animals depending on whether they 
are considered edible. However, further distinctions can be made between animals that can 
theoretically lead to different levels of exclusiveness (vs. inclusiveness) in moral circles. For 
example, companion animals (e.g., dogs and cats) usually receive special treatment and hold 
a high status relative to other animals (Herzog, 2010; Hodson, MacInnis, & Costello, 2014; 
Joy, 2010). Likewise, wild animals such as chimpanzees are usually perceived to have a high 
status given their high capabilities, perceived similarities to humans (Batt, 2009; Gray, Gray, 
& Wegner, 2007; Hodson et al., 2014; Plous, 1993), and their general strong appeal relative 
to other wild species (Veríssimo et al., 2017). Other types of wild animals (e.g., snails and 
snakes) are less similar to humans and perceived to be less appealing, based on aesthetical 
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characteristics and the emotional reaction they trigger (e.g., fear and disgust) (Batt, 2009; 
Knight, 2008; Veríssimo et al., 2017). Such animals are deemed of low status and likely 
considered less worthy of moral consideration (Batt, 2009; Gray et al., 2007), with 
consequences for attitudes towards their welfare and protection (Veríssimo et al., 2017). 
There is thus accumulating evidence illustrating the double standard that underlies 
individuals’ differential moral judgment and behaviors towards different animal categories. 
Extending this body of work, we investigate the role of ideologically-motivated beliefs about 
human-animal relations (i.e. human supremacy beliefs and vegetarianism threat) in predicting 
moral exclusion (vs. inclusion) of different animal categories.  
Overview and Hypotheses 
We employed a longitudinal design to test the effects of human supremacy beliefs and 
vegetarianism threat on the moral inclusion of different animal categories over time amongst 
USA respondents. The use of a cross-lagged model allowed us to investigate the 
simultaneous effects of these ideologically-motivated beliefs on moral inclusion of different 
animal categories over time, providing some insights into the direction of the associations 
between variables, while controlling for autoregressive paths. 
Drawing on previous evidence highlighting that the perceived moral status of animals 
reflects the relation that people have with them, we hypothesize that an animal’s social status 
will be an important determinant of whether an animal will be morally included. Specifically, 
we expect that high status animals (companion and appealing wild animals) will be more 
morally included than low status animals (food and unappealing wild animals). 
Moreover, we expect human supremacy beliefs and vegetarianism threat to have 
differential effects on moral exclusion of animals. Given that human supremacy beliefs 
reflect a general belief in the superior status of humans over all other species, we expect that 
greater endorsement of human supremacy beliefs will predict moral exclusion of all animal 
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categories. In contrast, we expect that the effects of vegetarianism threat will vary as a 
function of animal category. More specifically, considering that vegetarian ideologies are 
seen to defend the rights of food animals, we expect perceived vegetarianism threat to predict 
moral exclusion of this category in particular.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 A sample of USA participants was recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (see 
Burhmester, Kwan, & Gosling, 2011) and invited to complete an online survey including 
measures of human supremacy beliefs, vegetarianism threat, and moral inclusion of different 
animals. A total of 402 participants completed the survey at Time 1, 210 male and 192 
female, ranging from 20 to 74 (Mage = 39.26, SD = 13.19) years of age. They were each paid 
US $0.60. All participants were invited to complete the same survey again after 16 months 
(Time 2). A total of 223 participants responded at follow-up. Of these, four did not finish the 
survey and were therefore excluded from the analyses, resulting in a final sample of 219 
respondents (115 male, 104 female, ranging from 21 to 76 years of age, Mage = 42.92, SD = 
13.22). When asked about diet 76.3% of the participants self-identified as omnivore/meat-
eater, 13.7% semi-vegetarian/flexitarian, 3.7% pescetarian/ no meat but consume fish, 4.6% 
vegetarian, 1.8% vegan. Finally, we asked participants to indicate how frequently they ate 
meat (1 = never, 7 = every meal) (M = 4.71, SD = 1.33). Ethical approval was obtained from 
the ethics committee of the School of Psychology at the University of Kent.   
Measures 
 Participants completed the six items of the human supremacy beliefs scale developed 
by Dhont and Hodson (2014) on 7-point scales (e.g., “The life of an animal is just not of 
equal value as the life of a human being”; 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree), 
showing high internal consistency, Cronbach’s αT1 = .92 and αT2 = .93. Vegetarianism threat 
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was assessed with eight items (e.g., “The rise of vegetarianism poses a threat to our country’s 
cultural customs”; 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree; Dhont & Hodson, 2014; Dhont 
et al., 2016), with high internal consistency, Cronbach’s αT1 = .90 and αT2= .91.1 
To measure moral inclusion of animals we used Laham’s (2009) moral circle task. 
Participants were presented with a list of 20 animals belonging to one of four categories: high 
status companion animals, high status appealing wild animals, low status food animals, and 
low status unappealing wild animals2 (see Table 1). They were given the following 
instructions (Laham, 2009, p. 251): “When we think about animals in the world, we might 
feel a moral obligation to show concern for the welfare and interests of some of those 
animals. Below is a list of animals. Please select those that you feel morally obligated to 
show concern for” (0 = not selected, 1 = selected). A factor analysis with direct oblimin 
rotation revealed four factors (see Table 1), which explained 73.62% of the total variance. 
The four factors matched the expected categories of animals representing moral inclusion of 
a) food animals (e.g., chicken, pig), b) companion animals (e.g., cat, dog), c) appealing wild 
animals (e.g., dolphin, chimp), and d) unappealing wild animals (e.g., snake, snail). For each 
category, the proportion of selected animals was used as participants’ moral inclusion score 
(Cronbach’s αT1: .96, .77, .85, and .96; αT2 = .97, .71, .86, and .95, respectively).  
Results 
 We first conducted a MANOVA on all the variables of interest measured at Time 1 
(human supremacy beliefs, vegetarianism threat, and moral inclusion) to assess whether 
participants who participated at both time points did not differ significantly in these variables 
from those who dropped out. Results revealed no significant differences, F (6, 395) = 0.55, p 
= .770, partial η2 = .008; as such, selective dropout was an unlikely explanation for 
subsequent findings. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations between 
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variables. Human supremacy beliefs and vegetarianism threat were significantly associated 
with less moral inclusion of all animal categories within and across time points. 
Table 1 presents the average moral inclusion judgements for each animal, and Figure 
1 presents the percentages of moral inclusion of each animal category. As expected, the 
percentages of inclusion are overall higher for high status animals than for low status 
animals. We used paired-samples t-tests to compare moral inclusion of different animal 
categories. Participants were more inclusive of companion animals than any other animal 
category both at Time 1 and Time 2, all ts (218) ≥ 5.92, p < .001, d = 0.42 (see Figure 1). 
Furthermore, appealing wild animals were more morally included than both food and 
unappealing wild animals, all ts (218) ≥ 7.50, p < .001, d = 0.51. Food animals were still 
more likely to be morally included than unappealing wild animals, both at Time 1 and Time 
2, ts (218) ≥ 6.72, p < .001, d = 0.45.  
To investigate the longitudinal relations between human supremacy beliefs, 
vegetarianism threat, and moral inclusion of food animals, companion animals, appealing and 
unappealing wild animals, we tested a cross-lagged model using SEM with latent variables in 
Mplus (Version 7.1, Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2013). Items were averaged into parcels to 
attenuate measurement error. We created three parcels each for human supremacy beliefs, 
vegetarianism threat, moral inclusion of food animals, and unappealing wild animals. We 
created two parcels for moral inclusion of appealing wild animals. The observed score was 
used for moral inclusion of companion animals, given that only three animals were included 
in this category.  
To check whether the measurement model remained stable over time we first 
conducted longitudinal metric invariance testing. Specifically, we compared a longitudinal 
measurement model with freely estimated parameters with a model in which factor loadings 
of parallel indicators were constrained to be equal over time (i.e. defined to be invariant) (cf. 
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Brown, 2006; Christ & Wagner, 2013). This model comparison showed no significant 
differences between the constrained, X2 (336) = 436.08, p < .001, and unconstrained model, 
X2 (327) = 432.48, p < .001, Δχ2 = 3.60, df = 9, p = .936, supporting the assumption that the 
measurement properties of our measures remained stable over time.  
Having established longitudinal measurement invariance, we then tested a cross-
lagged model that included paths from both human supremacy beliefs and vegetarianism 
threat at Time 1 to each moral inclusion variable at Time 2. Furthermore, we included all 
autoregressive paths for each variable as well as the cross-lagged paths from the moral 
inclusion variables at Time 1 to human supremacy beliefs and vegetarianism threat at Time 2 
(see Figure 2).  The model fit the data well, X2 (348) = 469.40, p < .001; RMSEA = .04, CFI = 
.98, TLI = .98, SRMR = .04. 
As expected, the effects of human supremacy beliefs were general or diffuse, 
predicting moral inclusion of food animals (e.g., pig, cow, chicken) (β = -.22, p = .001, 
95%CI [-.35, -.10]), companion animals (e.g., dog, cat) (β = -.25, p < .001, 95%CI [-.38, -
.11]), appealing wild animals (e.g., dolphin, bear) (β = -.20, p = .005, 95%CI [-.33, -.06]), and 
unappealing wild animals (e.g., snake, snail) (β = -.18, p = .005, 95%CI [-.31, -.05]). In 
contrast, vegetarianism threat only significantly predicted moral inclusion of food animals (β 
= -.14, p = .036, 95%CI [-.27, -.10]) and appealing wild animals (β = -.18, p = .010, 95%CI [-
.32, -.05]), not of companion animals (β = .03, p = .670, 95%CI [-.11, .17]) or unappealing 
wild animals (β = -.08, p = .210, 95%CI [-.21, .05]) (see Figure 2 and Table 3)3. In other 
words, stronger beliefs in human supremacy were associated with more moral exclusion of 
all categories of animals over time. In contrast, stronger perceptions of vegetarianism threat 
were only associated with more moral exclusion of appealing wild animals and food animals 
over time. Importantly, none of the moral inclusion variables predicted human supremacy 
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beliefs or vegetarianism threat over time; that is, human superiority and vegetarianism threat 
predicted moral inclusion/exclusion but the reverse pattern was not supported longitudinally. 
Discussion 
Moral obligation towards animals varies widely as a function of how an animal is 
perceived, its functional role in society, and its relationship with humans. For instance, the 
vast majority of our respondents (90%) felt morally obliged to show concern for the welfare 
and interests of dogs (a companion animal), but only 51% felt the same about pigs (a food 
animal). We investigated, for the first time, the role of ideologically motivated beliefs related 
to human-animal relations in predicting moral exclusion of distinct animal categories over 
time. The results demonstrated that stronger human supremacy beliefs and vegetarianism 
threat predicted inclusion of fewer animals in individuals’ moral circles over a reasonably 
large time interval. More specifically, in line with our hypotheses, human supremacy beliefs 
predicted moral exclusion of all animal categories under investigation. That is, the stronger 
the dominance beliefs the more likely appealing and unappealing wild animals, companion 
animals, and food animals are being morally excluded. However, as expected, the effects of 
vegetarianism threat were more specific and only emerged for certain animal categories. 
Stronger vegetarianism threat predicted lesser moral inclusion of food animals, but not of 
companion animals and unappealing animals. Of note, this effect emerged above and beyond 
the effects of human supremacy beliefs. Interestingly, yet rather unexpected, vegetarianism 
threat also longitudinally predicted less moral inclusion of appealing wild animals. Taken 
together, our findings demonstrate the importance of human supremacy beliefs and 
vegetarianism threat for the way people think morally about animals. We will discuss these 
findings in light of the intergroup relations literature.    
Beliefs in Human Supremacy over Animals and Moral Exclusion of Animals 
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Human supremacy beliefs can serve as legitimizing myths to preserve hierarchy in 
human-animal relations and result in negative attitudes towards animals (Dhont & Hodson, 
2014). Our findings suggest that they can also perpetuate the exclusion of animals from moral 
circles of concern. The general impact of human supremacy beliefs on moral exclusion of all 
animals finds parallels in the generalized effects typically observed for social dominance 
orientation, reflecting the extent to which an individual prefers social inequality and 
hierarchy in (human) groups (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999). For instance, those higher in social dominance orientation are not only more likely to 
endorse racist attitudes (Hodson & Costello, 2007), they are also more likely to endorse 
sexist and homophobic attitudes (Kteily et al., 2012; Meeusen & Dhont, 2015; Whitley, 1999; 
Zick et al., 2008) as well as speciesist attitudes (Caviola, Everett, & Faber, in press; Dhont et 
al. 2014, 2016). The present findings thus provide further support for the similarities between 
support for inequality in human-human and human-animal relations, by showing that beliefs 
in superiority over animals have negative effects that generalize across different animal 
categories in similar ways as social dominance orientation has generic effects on attitudes 
towards human outgroups. 
Vegetarianism Threat and Moral Exclusion of Animals 
The present findings are also consistent with research on (human) intergroup threat 
showing that the effects of intergroup threat on outgroup attitudes can vary according to 
outgroups (e.g., Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Even though our study did not focus on different 
sources of outgroup threat, it provides support for the overall idea that the effects of 
vegetarianism threat vary depending on whether the animal category is protected by social 
movements that threaten cultural traditions. The effect of vegetarianism threat on the moral 
exclusion of food animals further illustrates that the pushback against the rise of 
vegetarianism goes well beyond the negative attitudes towards the initial source of threat - 
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vegetarians and vegans (MacInnis & Hodson, 2017). This is also well-illustrated by a popular 
bumper stick in the USA: “I didn’t claw my way to the top of the food chain to eat 
vegetables!”, which suggests that legitimization of human-animal domination reflects the 
idea of an acquired entitlement to rule over animals that is being threatened by the rise of 
vegetarianism.  
The idea that perceived vegetarianism threat can lead to an unintended pushback 
against both animals and vegetarians, is similar to how environmentalism threat predicts the 
denial of climate change (Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016). Together these findings suggest that the 
perceived threat that arises from movements that defy traditional practices of exploiting 
nature and animals might to a certain extent lead to more exploitative attitudes and behaviors 
possibly as a result of the need to protect cultural norms and traditions and a resistance to 
change. 
Although unexpected, the significant association between vegetarianism threat and 
moral exclusion of appealing wild animals (e.g., chimps, dolphins) could indicate that 
vegetarianism is also perceived as a threat to values beyond those related to eating habits. 
Indeed, given the environmental benefits of reducing meat consumption, vegetarianism might 
not solely trigger feelings of threat by questioning traditional dietary habits, but also be 
perceived as a broader threat towards exploitative environmental and anti-conservation 
practices. In fact, appealing wild animals are often flagship species (i.e. ambassadors) in 
marketing campaigns to raise awareness and funds to biodiversity conservation (Veríssimo, 
MacMillan, & Smith, 2011) and may symbolize these campaigns. The effects of 
vegetarianism threat on the moral exclusion of appealing wild animals may thus reflect a 
push back against these animals due to perceived environmentalism threat. 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
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Like all research, our project has limitations. Specifically, although commonly 
employed in the field, the use of cross-lagged panel models might not fully account for the 
stability of a trait-like, time-invariant nature (Hamaker, Kuiper, & Grasman, 2015). The 
inclusion of random intercepts in longitudinal models can address this issue but requires three 
or more waves of data. Hence, future research is needed to further test the robustness of the 
present findings in a three (or more)-wave longitudinal study. 
Our results suggest that the double standard in the moral inclusion of different animal 
categories depends on the status that they hold and their perceived role and functional 
purpose in society. However, given that decisions on moral inclusivity may be based on 
aspects such as physical characteristics (e.g., cuteness) or emotional reactions to animals 
(e.g., disgust), future research is needed to fully understand the emotional and motivational 
aspects underlying the moral inclusion of different animals.  
Furthermore, previous research found that “food” animals are ascribed less cognitive 
capabilities and less secondary emotions than other “non-edible” animals, suggesting that 
cognitive dissonance comes into play when individuals judge the capabilities of animals that 
they consume for food (Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012; Bilewicz, Imhoff, & 
Drogosz, 2011; Piazza & Loughnan, 2016). Specifically, disengaging from the origins of 
meat might serve the purpose of reducing the dissonance that might arise when people enjoy 
meat but are uncomfortable about harming animals (Bastian et al., 2012; Kunst & Hohle, 
2016). This process has been shown to reduce the attribution of intelligence (Bastian et al., 
2012) and secondary emotions (Bilewicz et al., 2011) to “food” animals. In line with this 
idea, our results indicate that food animals are pushed out of people’s moral circles, and even 
more so among those who strongly believe in human superiority over animals or feel 
threatened by the rise of vegetarianism. Although not directly tested in the present study, it is 
likely that cognitive dissonance plays an important role in explaining why humans 
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specifically push food animals out of their moral circles. Further research is necessary to test 
this idea. 
Similarly, future research could explore how differential moral inclusivity of animals 
varies cross-culturally. The results discussed in this paper are specific to the US context. 
Although we anticipate that the overall conceptual pattern would hold across cultures, 
specific animals comprising the categories would be likely to vary across cultures. For 
example, whereas here kangaroos belonged to the appealing wild animals, they might be 
categorized as food animals or unappealing wild animals and hold a lower status in Australia.  
Finally, future research can also manipulate similarities between humans and different 
animals to investigate the effects on attitudes towards different animal categories as well as 
prejudice towards human outgroups. Previous research has shown that human supremacy 
beliefs are associated with human outgroup prejudice via outgroup dehumanization (Costello 
& Hodson, 2010, 2014a, 2014b; Hodson et al., 2014). Increasing the similarity between 
humans and animals can, however, effectively reduce (human) outgroup prejudice by 
eliminating the derogatory animalistic comparison at its roots (Costello & Hodson, 2010) and 
expands individuals’ circle of moral concern for animals (Bastian et al., 2012). This research 
line could be extended by investigating the effects of increasing similarities between humans 
and different animal categories.  
Conclusion 
The present research contributes to the growing body of psychological research on 
human-animal relations (Amiot & Bastian, 2015) and provides further evidence for the 
parallels between the roles that dominance and threat play in human-human relations and 
human-animal relations. The present research provides the first longitudinal test of human 
supremacy beliefs and vegetarianism threat on the moral exclusion of animals, and supports 
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the assertion that ideological-motivated variables about human-animal relations precede 
moral exclusion of animals rather than the converse.  
  




 1The measures were part of a larger survey with variables not used in the present study. All 
the measures and data used in this paper are openly available at the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/2mkvu). 
 2To simplify, we will refer to these categories as companion, appealing wild, food, and 
unappealing wild animals. 
3To rule out the possibility that the effects were driven by the possible confounding role of 
participants’ meat consumption habits, we tested a model in which we controlled for 
frequency of meat consumption (at Time 1). The data fit the model well, X2 (366) = 487.44, p 
< .001; RMSEA = .04, CFI = .98, TLI = .98, SRMR = .04. Results show that the effects of 
human supremacy beliefs and vegetarianism threat still hold. Specifically, stronger beliefs in 
human superiority over animals were longitudinally associated with less moral inclusion of 
food animals (β = -.22, p = .001, 95%CI [-.35, -.09]), companion animals (β = -.25, p < .001, 
95%CI [-.39, -.11]), appealing wild animals (β = -.20, p = .006, 95%CI [-.34, -.06]), and 
unappealing wild animals (β = -.16, p = .015, 95%CI [-.29, -.03]). Furthermore, stronger 
vegetarianism threat was longitudinally associated with less moral inclusion of food animals 
(β = -.14, p = .043, 95%CI [-.27, -.004]), and appealing wild animals (β = -.19, p = .010, 
95%CI [-.33, -.04]), only. Noteworthy, none of the moral inclusion variables at Time 1 were 
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Table 1. Percentage of moral inclusion of each animal and results of factor analysis with 
direct oblimin rotation for moral inclusion items (Time 1). 
 


















Chicken 49%  .95 -.09 -.08 -.08 
Goat 53%  .89 -.01 -.04 .05 
Sheep 55%  .86 .06 .06 .07 
Pig 51%  .84 -.03 .08 .02 
Turkey 46%  .83 -.19 -.08 -.02 
Cow 58%  .79 .06 .16 .06 
Duck 55%  .54 -.19 .11 .11 
Snake 31%  -.02 -.97 -.02 .03 
Snail 29%  .03 -.93 -.09 .02 
Starfish 38%  -.08 -.88 .12 .03 
Crocodile 36%  .02 -.85 .10 <.01 
Bat 38%  .20 -.70 .06 -.04 
Frog 39%  .19 -.69 .03 .06 
Dolphin 79%  -.10 -.06 .80 -.01 
Chimp 76%  .12 <.01 .69 <.01 
Bear 62%  .14 -.16 .62 .07 
Kangaroo 60%  .26 -.15 .43 .14 
Cat 81%  .04 -.02 .05 .72 
Dog 90%  -.05 -.06 -.09 .69 
Horse 77%  .23 .14 .28 .58 




Table 2. Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Human supremacy T1             
2. Human supremacy T2 .86***            
3. Vegetarianism threat T1 .37*** .42***           
4. Vegetarianism threat T2 .35*** .37*** .70***          
5. Moral inclusion of food animals T1 -.35*** -.37*** -.32*** -.24***         
6. Moral inclusion of food animals T2 -.39*** -.43*** -.33*** -.32*** .52***        
7. Moral inclusion of unappealing wild animals T1 -.37*** -.37*** -.36*** -.30*** .75*** .55***       
8. Moral inclusion of unappealing wild animals T2 -.36*** -.40*** -.31*** -.22** .50*** .79*** .63***      
9. Moral inclusion of appealing wild animals T1 -.33*** -.34*** -.35*** -.29*** .69*** .42*** .61*** .36***     
10. Moral inclusion of appealing wild animals T2 -.37*** -.42*** -.36*** -.32*** .41*** .75*** .45*** .65*** 51***    
11. Moral inclusion of companion animals T1 -.17* -.16* -.20** -.18** .57*** .22** .40*** .22** 54*** 27***   
12. Moral inclusion of companion animals T2 -.29*** -.30*** -.13* -.14* .27*** .54*** .28*** .41*** 37*** 62*** 37***  
M (SD) 4.21(1.73) 4.17(1.80) 2.69(1.30) 2.64(1.36) .52(.45) .57(.46) .35(.44) .44(.45) .69(.38) .74(.37) .83(.31) .88(.26) 
Notes * p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001; potential scores on moral inclusion variables could range from 0 to 1.




Table 3. Cross-lagged model testing the longitudinal associations between human supremacy, 







Time 1 Time 2  β [95% CI] p 
Human 
supremacy 
Human supremacy .84 [.777, .893] < .001 
Vegetarianism threat .13 [.013, .250] .030 
MI of food animals -.22 [-.349, -.094] .001 
MI of companion animals -.25 [-.382, -.113] < .001 
MI of appealing wild animals -.20, [-.332, -.059] .005 
MI of unappealing wild animals -.18 [-.307, -.054] .005 
Vegetarianism 
threat 
Human supremacy .10 [.020, .185] .015 
Vegetarianism threat .68 [.575, .776] < .001 
MI of food animals -.14 [-.269, -.009] .036 
MI of companion animals .03 [-.109, .170] .670 
MI of appealing wild animals -.18 [-.322, -.045] .010 
MI of unappealing wild animals -.08 [-.213, .047] .210 
Moral inclusion 
of food animals 
Human supremacy -.06 [-.200, .087] .440 
Vegetarianism threat .10 [-.113, .306] .369 




Human supremacy .04 [-.047, .127] .365 
Vegetarianism threat -.06 [-.191, .062] .320 




Human supremacy -.03 [-.160, .107] .697 
Vegetarianism threat -.01 [-.203, .184] .922 




Human supremacy .02 [-.096, .143] .701 
Vegetarianism threat -.04 [-.213, .136] .664 
MI of unappealing wild animals .47 [.365, .573] < .001 




Figure 1. Mean levels of moral inclusion of different animal categories at Time 1 and Time 
2. 
Figure 2. Cross-lagged model testing the longitudinal associations between human 
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Notes: All coefficients are standardized. All variables were allowed to correlate within each time point.  
* p <.05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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